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Abstract
Profit earned by defense contractors is a controversial issue among government officials
and the defense industry. It is recognized that profits earned by defense contractors
are not strictly the product of the dynamics of a competitive market, but of federal
profit statutes, contractual incentive schemes, the quality of government oversight,
and in a market of less than full competition. As such, there is always concern of
whether contractors are earning “excessive” profit – through policy or failed oversight.
The purpose of this research is to investigate the question of reasonable profits from
one particular angle – whether profit margins differ among two different categories of
contractors, primes and sub-contractors. We assume rational behavior from contrac-
tors, and expect profit to rise where, broadly speaking, opportunity permits. Primes
and subs face different opportunity. Principal-agent theory predicts sub-contractors
may find opportunity to achieve higher profits. Asymmetric information theory pre-
dicts those with a special expertise in figuring out the complex DoD environment
may earn higher profits. This study examine whether contractors may earn differen-
tial returns based on their distance from oversight, and their relative expertise toward
others on projects. The study finds that sub-contractors, in the aggregate do not earn
higher median profits than primes. However, it finds that expertise does appear to
be a significant characteristic at a finer level of analysis. Expertise correlates with
higher median profits. And, sub-contractors who exhibit this expertise earn higher
median profits than both their primes and other sub-contractors.
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AN ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTOR PROFIT MARGIN
PERCENTAGES
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Profit earned by defense contractors is a controversial issue among government
officials and the defense industry. Profit earned by defense contractors is of peren-
nial concern because it is recognized that profits are not strictly the product of the
dynamics of a competitive market but of federal profit statutes, contractual incen-
tive schemes, the quality of government oversight, and in a market of less than full
competition (Subpart 15-4 - Contract Pricing, n.d.). As such, there is always concern
of whether contractors are earning more than necessary – through policy or failed
oversight. Despite concerns, little research has been conducted using Department of
Defense (DoD) data to analyze what variables drive defense contractor profit.
The debate over defense contractor profit is largely driven by the question of
whether or not the defense industry derives “excessive profit” from government and
DoD funded initiatives. Previous research has attempted to answer the subjective
question of what excessive profit is, however, the conceptual trouble of defining “ex-
cessive” make it difficult to come to a consensus. Relevant profit metrics differ between
companies and sectors. With no single accepted profit metric being used, research has
yielded conflicting findings (Fisher, F. M., McGowan, J. J., 1983). This study skips
the question of what is excessive, and instead aims to identify conditions in which de-
fense contractors tend to earn higher profit margins. In doing so, it hopes to indirectly
1
contribute to understanding when profit becomes unreasonable or problematic.
The concern about “excessive profit” remains the backdrop of the discussion, as it
has been noted as influencing decisions. In testimony to the House of Representatives
Committee, Pierre Chao, Senior Associate at the Center of Strategic and International
Studies, emphasizes the economic and profit incentives embedded in the acquisition
system create adverse results. He states, “Culturally, we have evolved to a point
where we would rather pay $1 billion and 5% profit for a defense good, than $500
million and 20% profit”(Chao, 2013, p. 5). If so, the attempt to avoid profit, and the
scrutiny it invites has biased DoD towards inefficient practices. Therefore, knowing
if profit margins are reasonable could shift the bias towards a more overall effective
means of managing programs.
In the same vein, the acquisition community has recently expressed concern over
the profit earned by sub-contractors. In 2015, the Under Secretary of Defense, Ac-
quisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) found evidence to support this
concern by comparing the median prime and sub-contractor profit margins on Ma-
jor Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and subsystems (2001-2015). The study
found that during both development and production, sub-contractors earned higher
profit margins than primes. However, the USD(AT&L) study noted further anal-
ysis is required to understand these differences (USD(AT&L), 2015). The current
study seeks to understand these differences and identify statistically significant profit
drivers.
Rhea (2017) used contractor cost data on aircraft, missiles, and UAV commodi-
ties to further explore prime versus sub-contractor profit. Median profit percentage
by phase, contract type, commodity, and service were used to determine differences.
Rhea found neither contractor group to have a consistent advantage over the other.
The current study readdresses the issue, and expands the scope of previous studies
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through the use of further commodities, an expanded data set, and a new methodol-
ogy.
1.2 Problem Statement
The purpose of this research is to to investigate the question of reasonable prof-
its from one particular angle – whether profit margins differ among two different
categories of contractors, primes and sub-contractors. We assume rational behavior
from contractors, and expect profit to rise where, broadly speaking, opportunity per-
mits. Primes and subs face different opportunity. Principal-agent theory predicts
sub-contractors may find opportunity to achieve higher profits. Asymmetric informa-
tion theory predicts those with a special expertise in figuring out the complex DoD
environment may earn higher profits. This study examine whether contractors may
earn differential returns based on their distance from oversight, and their relative
expertise toward others on projects.
1.3 Research Questions
This study will seek to answer several questions. First, do contractors derive higher
profit margins in an environment characterized as being less scrutinized by govern-
ment? In particular, do sub-contractors earn higher profit margins? The principal-
agent theory predicts that – a sub might extract higher profits where in the prime as
an agent is not incentivized to fully control sub-contractor costs (Eisenhardt, 1989)
Second, does contractor expertise in the DoD environment extract more profit?
The study takes the magnitude of DoD contract dollars and number of contracts
awarded as a proxy for contractor expertise. Third, does the disparity of expertise
(expertise, as already defined) between primes and sub-contractors matter? There are
two arrangements or “dyads” of big and small in practice (“expert” prime – “other”
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sub; “expert” prime – “expert” sub), which can be accurately analyzed. Asymmetric
information theory suggests that in the first dyad, the primes “win,” or earns higher
profit compared to the sub. In the second (where there is no particular expertise
advantage), the sub-contractor might earn high profits by exploiting regulations under
less scrutiny. In particular, their expertise may allow them to exploit the opportunity
of “pass through” and possibly even engage in strategic bargaining, whereby the agent
of the prime is lax towards the secondary agent of the sub when they are equals –
expecting similar lax treatment when the relationships are reversed.
1.4 Methodology
This study used Cost Data Summary Reports (CDSRs/1921s) to calculate the
profit margins. CDSRs were pulled from the Defense Automated Cost Information
Management System (DACIMS) on 28 June 2018. This dataset consisted of 1567
CDSRs (959 primes and 608 subs). The policy for the management of all acquisitions
programs is established in the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02.
The DoDI 5000.02 requires both prime and subcontractors to submit CDSRs on all
contracts valued over $50 million. Additionally, the Program Manager and/or the
Deputy Director, Cost Assessment (DDCA) can require CDSRs for high-risk or high-
technical-interest contracts priced between $20 million and $50 million (Department
of Defense Instruction 5000.02, 2015).
JMP R© Pro 13 was used to complete all the statistical analysis in this study. First,
a comparison analysis examined the influence of expertise on profit margins. A com-
parison of prime and sub contractor profit margins was completed. Sample t-tests
and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to test for statistical significance when
comparing the different groups of data.
Next, contingency table analysis was used to explore the hypothesis that “expert”
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contractors earn a higher profit regardless of the prime – sub dyad. The two dyads
this study is concerned with are ‘expert prime – expert sub’ and ‘expert prime – other
sub.’ The statistical significance of these dyads was tested using the Fisher’s Exact
Test. Odds ratios and confidence intervals were also reported. Finally, Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression was used identify profit drivers as well as determine
which were most predictive. The regression model was created using the JMP R©’s
mixed stepwise OLS function.
1.5 Assumption/Limitations
This study only analyzes ACAT I programs and contracts that are 95-100% com-
plete. The format of the CDSR has changed over the years with the two most recent
versions being 2007 and 2011. These were the only versions of the CDSR that were
able to be exported from DACIMS. Additionally, only development and production
phase contracts were used in this study. Data from the CDSRs was used to calculate
realized profit margins for primes and sub-contractors. This research assumes the
data reported on the CDSRs is accurate.
1.6 Thesis Overview
This thesis consists of 5 chapters. Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant
literature, including economic theories, DoD profit regulations, and recent studies
comparing profit within the defense industry. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology
including data cleaning steps and creation of dummy and categorical variable neces-
sary for the analysis techniques used. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the analysis
and discusses them individually and as a group. Chapter 5 outlines the key findings
from the analysis and presents some ideas for future research work.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
The topic of profit earned by defense contractors is of perennial concern because it
is recognized that profits are not the natural by-product of a competitive market, but
rather something the government itself partially influences through its profit policy
and contractual incentive schemes. The defense industry operates in an oligopolis-
tic market structure where in a small number of large sellers dominate the market.
Such high market concentration gives defense contractors unique bargaining power.
Likewise, the government’s position as a monopsonist gives it a unique power and a
responsibility to provide adequate profit.
A 2018 study calculated the defense industry market concentration using data
from the Defense Contract Action Data System (DCADS) Carril, R., Duggan, M,
2018). The calculation included all non-classified DoD contracts awarded from 1985-
2001 that had a value of $25,000 or more. Figure 1 shows the change in the defense
market concentration over time. The share of DoD contract dollars awarded to the
five largest DoD contractors rose from 21.7 percent in 1990 to 31.3 percent in 2000.
This higher concentration decreased competition creating an increase in sole source
contracts. Despite the increased market concentration, the researchers found no ev-
idence that it increased acquisition cost. The researchers suggests this could be due
to the government’s position as buyer as well as the long-term relationships formed
Carril, R., Duggan, M, 2018). The 2018 study did not analyze the effect of this
increased market share on defense contractor profit. However, it is widely recognized
that there is a strong relationship between market share and return on investment
(Furhan, 1972).
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Figure 1. U.S. Defense Spending and Concentration (adapted from Carril, R., Duggan,
M, 2018)
Unlike the competitive market where products are standardized and there are
many choices, the defense industry often buys highly customized weapon systems that
require a multi-year process. Demand is highly uncertain and is largely a function
of the political environment. Prices are based primarily on a contractor’s actual or
anticipated costs using cost estimating methods rather than the market setting the
price. The unique market structure of the defense industry makes it difficult to weigh
in on whether the profit earned by defense contractors is appropriate relative to other
industries.
A number of studies have nonetheless attempted to compare profit and make
the subjective evaluation of what is “excessive” profit. Most have concluded at the
aggregate there higher profits in the defense industry compared to other industries
(Stigler & Friedland, 1971; Lichtenberg, 1992; Wang & San Miguel, 2012). This study
will instead compare profit margins of different contractors within the defense industry
and help to derive insights from that novel perspective. It is believed this lower level
of aggregation permits a richer quialitative discussion of what is reasonable.
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This literature review has three areas of focus to form the hypothesis tested in
Chapter 4. First, the economic theories that provide the framework for the empirical
tests conducted in this study are reviewed. Second, we describe the uniqueness of the
DoD regulations and acquisition process that relate to profit. Finally, this chapter
reviews recent studies that compare profit margins within the defense industry.
2.2 Experiential Knowledge
The uniqueness of the defense industry requires a certain level of industry knowl-
edge to operate in. There are two overarching types of knowledge, ‘experiential knowl-
edge’ and ‘objective knowledge’ which differ in terms of the way each is acquired
(Petersen, Pedersen, Sharma, 2003). Objective knowledge is acquired through stan-
dardized methods and market research (Petersen, Pedersen, Sharma, 2003). It is
a technical knowledge easily codified and communicated. Experiential knowledge is
acquired through carrying out activities (Petersen, Pedersen, Sharma, 2003). It is
not as easily communicated or imitated. It becomes proprietary turning an initial
advantage into an enduring market advantage.
Research on internationalization has focused on the role of experiential knowledge.
Internationalization is the process of increasing involvement of enterprises in inter-
national markets (Petersen, Pedersen, Sharma, 2003). This research serves as a fair
analogy for firms trying to figure out the uniqueness of the DoD market. And it
suggests an important role for experiential knowledge for firms in new markets.
Johansen and Vahlne (1977) found that experiential knowledge is more valuable
compared to objective knowledge and leads to firms taking steps towards opening
new markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). The current study does not distinguish
between the two types, but rather derives from it the findings that time and breadth
of experience can serve an important role for a firm in a highly unique market setting.
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The defense industry is highly regulated and understanding the ends and out of the
regulations requires experiential knowledge. With profit being negotiated through
profit policies rather than the market determining profit, experience in negotiating
with government contractors is likely highly beneficial.
2.3 Principal-Agent Theory
The principal-agent theory focuses on the relationship between one party (the prin-
cipal) that employs another party (the agent) for work. One example of a principal-
agent relationship is a buyer hiring a supplier. The buyer (principal) assigns duties,
responsibilities, and decision-making authority to the supplier (agent) through con-
tracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). The focus of the principal-agent theory is on determining
the optimal contract between two parties such that the agent serves the principal’s
interests in their fullest in further negotiations with 3rd parties (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The relationship between the DoD and defense contractors can be interpreted as
a principal-agent situation; therefore, the application of this theory should provide
insight into defense contractor profit margins. For a given contract, it is usual for
the DoD to interact with one defense contractor (prime). But, in order to complete
a project these contractors will invoke the services of sub-contractors. The DoD
(principal) relies on the prime contractor (agent) to not only deliver a product or
service, but also efficiently manage sub-contractors (agents).
There are two overarching problems principal-agency theory is concerned with
resolving. One problem is conflicting goals between the principal and agent, and the
second is the problem of risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989). These two problems apply
to the relationships within defense contracting. The government’s goal is to acquire
the best product or service for the lowest price; the goal of a defense contractor is to
make the largest profit possible. This is self-evident. But if the prime takes action
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with sub-contractors in a manner that does not keep prices low for the DoD, then a
principal-agent conflict arises. Negligence, ineptitude, and opportunism are all moral
hazards an agent may display which ultimately harms the principal. The agent is not
acting in good faith. Likewise, with risk-sharing, parties have their own view on the
amount of risk they want to take on.
At the heart of the principal-agent problem is information asymmetry. Information
asymmetry is where one party has more information or better information than the
other creating an imbalance of power in a transaction. Agents have more knowledge
in their specific field and not sharing this knowledge with the principal leads to
information asymmetries. Moral hazard and opportunism arise. Moral hazard occurs
when an agent has more information about his or her actions or intentions than the
principal does, because the principal usually cannot completely monitor the agent.
Opportunism is, “self-interest with guile” (Williamson, 1973 p. 317). Williamson
further explains the two most common forms of opportunism. The first being the
strategic disclosure of information. The second type is due to first-mover advantages,
where the winner of original bids acquire experience which places them at a cost
advantage compared to non-winners during future negotiations (Williamson, 1973).
Information asymmetry and the issues that arise from it are relevant to the de-
fense industry. The DoD relies on the defense contractors to provide cost and price
information that is used to build budgets and develop future cost estimates. Defense
contractors have incentives to hide or exclude information to increase profits or win
contract awards. For example, a prime could potentially submit a lower bid on a
development contract to win the award knowing they will likely secure a sole source
contact later for production. This increases its chances of earning higher profits over
the long run.
A way to attempt to overcome the issue of information asymmetry is through
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screening. Screening is a technique used by one agent to extract otherwise private
information from the other (Akerlof, 1978). The DoD employs this technique through
regulations that increase oversight and require defense contractors to provide cost
and price data. However, contractors also have means to gain information from the
DoD. Some contractors gain more experience in the defense industry and may use
their increased knowledge of expectations and behaviors of contracting officers over
time to increase profit margins. The more experience a contractor has in the defense
industry, the more they know they can use this experience to potentially derive higher
profits.
Sharing many similarities with principal-agent theory is the transaction cost theory
(Dahlman, 1979). Transaction costs include the costs of searching for information,
bargaining, policing and enforcement (Dahlman, 1979). In his famous article, “Na-
ture of the Firm,” Coase (1937) argues that a firm will continue to expand until the
marginal cost of expanding becomes greater than transaction costs. Once internal
production costs exceed the market transaction costs, outsourcing tendencies arise
(Coase, 1937). The DoD outsources where it is too much effort to organize the work
internally and prime contractors do the same. But, with each outsourcing step more
policing of agent behavior is required (Coase, 1937). Having fewer policing require-
ments of sub-contractors by the DoD, puts the responsibility on the incentive structure
between the principal and agent. A concern in the DoD is whether the DoD has done
enough here, or should it increase scrutiny of sub-contractors. If DoD incentives and
oversight are deficient than we should expect primes with greater experience in the
defense industry to have higher profit and more distant sub-contractors with greater
experience in the industry to have even higher profits.
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2.4 Profit Regulations
There are reasons to believe that the aforementioned forces may be at work. Profit
earned by defense contractors must be addressed by the DoD at two critical times.
The first is when a contract is being negotiated, and the second is after the contract
is complete. The Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) prescribes the cost and price
negotiation policies and procedures for pricing negotiated contracts. The Defense Fed-
eral Acquisitions Regulation Supplement (DFARS) states contracting officers “shall
use a structured approach for developing a pre-negotiation profit or fee objective on
any negotiated contract action when certified cost or pricing data is obtained, except
for cost-plus-award-fee contracts” (Subpart 15-4 - Contract Pricing, n.d.). The most
common structured approach is the weighted guidelines method.
The weighted guidelines method focuses on four profit factors: performance risk,
contract type risk, facilities capital, and cost efficiency (DFARS PGI 215.404-Profit,
n.d.). The profit factor addresses the contractor’s degree of risk in fulfilling contract
requirements. The first of these factors, performance risk, initially consisted of three
elements that contracting officers could assign a standard profit range of 2 to 6 percent:
1. Technical—the technical uncertainties of performance.
2. Management—the degree of management effort necessary to ensure the contract
requirements are met.
3. Cost control—the contractor’s efforts to reduce and control costs.
The weights of these 3 elements are determined by the contractor officer, but
have been impacted also by legislation. In the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000, Congress mandated that the DoD review it’s profit guidelines.
Specifically, Congress wanted the DoD to consider modifications to the performance
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risk factor. The focus was to increase incentives for contractors to produce complex
and innovative new technology and weapons systems. This review resulted in technol-
ogy incentives being added to the DoDs profit policy. The first change increased the
weight contracting officers would likely assign to the technical performance risk ele-
ment by combining the management and control element. The second change added
a technology incentive to award contractors for innovation. These changes allowed
contracting officers to assign and profit range of 6 to 10 percent as opposed to the
standard range of 2 to 6 percent (GAO, 2001). The current study uses data entirely
from this new era.
The second factor, contract type, focuses on the degree of cost risk accepted by
the contractors under varying contract types. There are multiple contract types
that generally fall into two categories: cost reimbursable contracts and fixed price
contracts. Figure 2 depicts the inverse risk relationship for the most common types
of contacts. Generally, contractors assume more risk with fixed contracts compared
to cost contracts.
Figure 2. Types of Contracts by Risk (DAU, 2018)
Table 1 provides the normal value and designated range for profit percentages
based on contract type. Generally speaking, contractors are awarded higher profit as
they assume more contract type risk. Firm-fixed price contracts with no financing,
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being the most risky for the contractor, have the highest profit percent. Whereas
cost-plus contacts, being less risky to the contractor, have the lowest profit percent.
This creates an incentive for contractors to negotiate for a firm-fixed contract when
they know their risk is low in attempt to earn higher profit margins (DFARS PGI
215.404-Profit, n.d.).
Table 1. Contract Type Profit (%) (adapted from DFARS PGI 215.404-Profit, n.d.)
Contract Type Normal Value (%) Designated Range (%)
Firm-fixed-Price, no financing 5 4 - 6
Firm-fixed-price, with
performance-based payments
4 2.5 - 5.5
Firm-fixed-price, with progress
payments
3 2 - 4
Fixed-price incentive, no
financing
2 0.5 - 3.5
Fixed-price incentive, with
progress payments
1 0 - 2
Cost-plus-incentive-fee 1 0 - 2
Cost-plus-fixed-fee 0.5 0 - 1
The third factor, facilities capital, rewards contractors for capital investments in
facilities that benefit the DoD. It is calculated by applying cost-of-money rate to
the facilities capital employed (DFARS PGI 215.404-Profit, n.d.). The final factor,
the cost efficiency factor, provides contractors with incentives to reduce cost. The
contracting officer can increase the pre-negotiated profit objective by 4 percent of
the total objective cost (DFARS PGI 215.404-Profit, n.d.). Criteria used for this
adjustment include prior contract cost reductions achieved, reduction of excess fa-
cilities, contractor’s process improvements that reduce costs, and subcontractor cost
reductions.
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Statutory Limitations
The FAR also addresses the statutory limitations imposed by 10 U.S.C an 2306(d)
and 41 U.S.C. 25(b). These limitations, identified in Table 2, apply to cost-plus-fixed
fee contracts and only prime contractors.
Table 2. Statutory Limitations (FAR 15.404, n.d.)
Type of Contract Fee Limitation
Experimental, developmental,
or research work performed
under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract
15% of estimated contract
cost, excluding fee
All other cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts
10% of estimated contract
cost, excluding fee
Pass-Through Charges
These profit guidelines primarily apply to prime contractors. Profit for sub-
contractors is a growing concern that Congress has attempted to increase oversight.
Pass-through charges are defined as overhead costs or profit passed to the Government
by contractors adding no or negligible value over work done by lower-tier contractors
(FAR 52.215, n.d.) Starting with the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006,
Congress has been trying to eliminate “excessive” pass through charges. The Post-
Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 introduced limitations on tiering of subcon-
tractors after allegation that lower-tier subcontractors were grossly overpaid during
the reconstruction following the hurricane. This was primarily due to tiering of sub-
contractors by four to five levels creating excessive pass-through charges (Congress,
2007).
The 2007 National Defense Authorization (NDAA) also introduced provisions re-
garding pass-through charges. The 2007 NDAA introduced the requirement that
independent estimate of costs of the future combat systems shall address pass-trough
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charges by the lead systems integrator and its major subcontractors (109th Congress,
2007). Following the 2009 NDAA, the FAR was amended to disallow excessive pass-
through charges and requires contractors to provide a detailed proposal if they intend
to subcontract more than 70 percent of the total cost of work (FAR 52.215, n.d.). Not
only is the U.S. government cracking down on pass-through charges, but it is holding
contractors accountable. In 2012, Lockheed Martin Corp. agreed to pay $15.8 million
to the U.S government to settle allegations that they passed on inflated costs of tools
by their subcontractor Tools & Metals Inc. (TMI) (Seper, 2012).
The DoD’s complex system to determine profit and the updating and adjusting
of policy make it difficult for contractors to navigate. The DoD environment differs
greatly from the free market and requires distinct expertise to understand. There-
fore, it seems entirely reasonable for contractors with more expertise in the DoD
environment to earn higher profit.
2.5 Profit Studies of DoD
Since 2013 the office of the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisitions,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has reported on the performance of the De-
fense Acquisitions. A study in the 2015 report compared first-tier sub-contractor final
profit margins (fraction of price going to fee or profit) with their associated prime
contractors on the same program during development and production. The subs ana-
lyzed were large-scale and did not provide commercial items. The analysis concluded
that sub-contractors earned higher margins in both production and development.
During development, the sub-contractors earned a median profit margin percent-
age of 8.3% whereas primes only earned a median of 6.2%. The difference was much
larger during production, with sub-contractors earning 16.3% and primes only earn-
ing 9% (USD(AT&L),2015). However, these findings are not compelling as the study
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used weighted averages. This means it took the unusual approach of combining two
variables, size and profit, corrupting the view of profit. Furthermore, no statisti-
cal testing was completed to determine of the medians were statistically different.
Nonetheless, this study provides a motive for the current study. It also captures the
sentiment shared by some that sub-contractors may earn “excessive” profit.
A 2017 study by Rhea followed up on the USD(AT&L) study and compared profit
percentages between prime and sub-contractor for aircraft, missiles, and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). Rhea employed a more rigorous approach. He used contractor
cost data to see if one contractor group had an advantage over the other regarding
profit. Table 3 summarizes the results of Rhea’s study. It is important to note that
statistical tests were not conducted to determine if the observed difference in means
and medians are statistically significant. This study does yield the findings that there
is no substantial significance; meaning most of the means and medians are very close
together. At the aggregate the profit margin for prime contractors was found to be
14.3% and for subcontractors it was 14.6% (Rhea, 2017).
Table 3. Profit Margin Results (adpated from Rhea, 2017)
Variable
Sample Size
(Prime/Sub)
Median
(Prime/Sub)
Mean
(Prime/Sub)
Std Dev
(Prime/Sub)
Aggregate 389 / 276 14.3% / 14.6% 15.6% / 14.6% 9.6% / 13.5%
Dev 37 / 19 8.3% / 6.7% 9.1% / 5.0% 10.5% / 13.6%
Prod 352 / 257 15.0% / 15.1% 16.3% / 15.3% 9.3% / 13.3%
Cost 51 / 39 9.0% / 13.0% 10.4% / 12.5% 6.7% / 5.3%
Fixed 247 / 219 16.6% / 15.5% 17.5% / 15.1% 10.5% / 14.8%
Other 91 / 18 12.9% / 11.2% 13.3% / 13.2% 6.7% / 8.4%
Aircraft 288 / 241 14.7% / 14.2% 16.0% / 14.3% 9.2% / 14.1%
Missiles 69 / 28 13.6% / 17.6% 14.6% / 17.7% 11.5% / 8.2%
UAV 32 / 7 12.3% / 16.3% 14.2% / 13.4% 8.8% / 6.7%
Air Force 75 / 16 12.0% / 16.1% 12.7% / 12.5% 7.3% / 14.5%
Army 107 / 61 16.7% / 13.5% 18.4% / 12.4% 9.1% / 18.2%
Navy 200 / 115 14.5% / 16.0% 15.4% /17.4% 10.4% / 11.9%
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Breaking out the aggregate revealed potential differences, but it is important to
note that nothing is systematic. In his comparison of median profit margins by
acquisition phase, Rhea found that prime contractors may have higher margins in
development. In a comparison by contract type, sub-contractors may have higher
profit margins compared to cost contracts. In a comparison by service, the results are
varied (Rhea, 2017). These finding do not corroborate the 2015 USD(AT&L) study.
It is important to note that Rhea did not weight the values as the previous study
did (Rhea, 2017). With mixed finding between the two studies and the absence of
statistical testing, further analysis is warranted.
2.6 Questions Derived
From this literature review several questions follow. First, do contractors de-
rive higher profit margins in an environment characterized as being less scrutinized
by government? In particular, do sub-contractors earn higher profit margins? The
principal-agent theory predicts that – a sub might extract higher profits where in the
prime as an agent is not incentivized to fully control sub-contractor costs (Eisenhardt,
1989) Second, does contractor expertise in the DoD environment extract more profit?
The study takes the magnitude of DoD contract dollars and number of contracts
awarded as a proxy for contractor expertise. Third, does the disparity of expertise
(expertise, as already defined) between primes and sub-contractors matter? There are
two arrangements or “dyads” of big and small in practice (“expert” prime – “other”
sub; “expert” prime – “expert” sub), which can be accurately analyzed. Asymmetric
information theory suggests that in the first dyad, the primes “win,” or earns higher
profit compared to the sub. In the second (where there is no particular expertise ad-
vantage), the sub-contractor might earn high profits by exploiting regulations under
less scrutiny. In particular, their expertise may allow them to exploit the opportu-
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nity of “pass through” and possibly even engage in strategic bargaining, whereby the
agent of the prime is lax towards the secondary agent of the sub when they are equals
– expecting similar lax treatment when the relationships are reversed.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Overview
Chapter 3 provides the methodology to examine profit margin percentages be-
tween primes and subcontractors for ACAT I Major Defense Acquisitions Programs
(MDAP). This section will provide the source of the data, the calculations used for
this study, and describe the data cleaning process. This section will also explain the
statistical process used to perform the analysis in Chapter 4.
3.2 Data
The data used for this research was extracted on 28 June 2018 from the Defense
Automated Cost Information System (DACIMS). DACIMS is part of the Cost As-
sessment Data Enterprise (CADE). CADE is the central repository for all ACAT I
Contractor Cost Data Reports (CCDRs). There are four types of CCDRs: Cost Data
Summary Report (CDSR/1921), Function Cost Report (1921-1), Progress Curve Re-
port (1921-2), and Contractor Business Data Report (1921-3).
The DoDI 5000.02 requires both prime and subcontractors to submit CDSRs on
all contracts valued over $50 million. Additionally, the Program Manager and/or
the Deputy Director, Cost Assessment (DDCA) can require CDSRs for high-risk or
high-technical-interest contracts priced between $20 million and $50 million (USD
(AT&L), 2015). For CDSR purposes, the term “contract” (or “subcontract”) may
refer to a standalone contract, to a specific task or delivery order, to a contract line
item number, or to a series of line item numbers within a contract (DodDI 5000.02,
n.d.).
There are three types of CDSRs: Initial Reports, Interim Reports, and Final
Reports. The current study only analyzed “Final” CDSRs for ACAT I development
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and production contracts at the summary level (WBS 1). Final Reports are intended
to capture all or substantially all actual contract costs. A Final Report is required as
of the last day of the month when at least 95% of the contract cost have been incurred
and the final end item has been accepted by the government (Data item description
“Cost Data Summary Report”, 2011). For this research, the data was exported from
DACIMS by running a query for all “Final” CDSRs. In the original dataset, there
were 2032 CDSRs (1187 prime and 780 subs).
3.3 Calculations
The following calculations were performed on the original 2032 CCDRs before the
data cleaning process. For each contract, the percent complete and profit margin
percentage was calculated.
Percent Complete
The percent complete formula was used to ensure only contracts that were at
least 95% complete were used in the analysis. Percent complete was calculated using
Equation 1.
%Complete =
Subtotal Cost+G&A (to date)
Subtotal Costs+G&A+ UB (at Completion)
(1)
Where
- Subtotal costs: “Total cost provided by the highest level WBS Reporting Ele-
ment” (Data item description “Cost Data Summary Report”, 2011)
- General & Administrative(G&A): “Indirect expenses related to overall manage-
ment and administration of the contractor’s business unit” (Data item descrip-
tion “Cost Data Summary Report”, 2011)
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- Undistributed Budget (UB): “Portion of the budget applicable to program ef-
fort that has not yet been allocated to control account budgets” (Data item
description “Cost Data Summary Report”, 2011)
Profit Margin Percentage
There are two ways to refer to contractor profit, either as “profit” or as “fee.”
Typically, “fee” is the amount contractors receive on cost-reimbursable contracts and
“profit” is what contractors receive on fixed-type contracts. This research will refer
to both terms as “profit.” Equation 2 was used to calculate the profit margin for
cost and other types of contracts. Since only contracts that were greater than 95%
complete were analyzed, 99% of the dataset no UB remaining and 83% had no MR.
Profit Margin% =
Profit
Subtotal Costs+G&A+ UB +MR
(2)
Where
- Management Reserve: “Total allocated budget that is held back for manage-
ment control and risk purposes at the total contract level” (Data item descrip-
tion “Cost Data Summary Report”, 2011)
3.4 Data Cleaning
Table 4 shows the data cleaning process used for this research. The original dataset
consisted of 2032 CDSRs, 1187 primes, and 780 subs. There were also CDSRs for
which the contractor type was unknown. All unknown contractor types in the final
dataset were manually reviewed in DACIMS to determine whether the contractor was
a prime or sub. Equation 1 was used to calculate the percent complete and CDSRs
that were not 95% complete were excluded. CDSRs for which were missing the profit
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or for which the profit margin was greater than 100% were removed because it was
believed these were errors.
Next, duplicates were identified and the older version of the duplicate was re-
moved. Since this study was only concerned with the development and production
phases, Operations & Support (O&S) contracts were removed. Additionally, CD-
SRs that could not be identified as either development or production contracts were
also removed. Lastly, if a period of performance date was missing and could not be
determined by locating the CDSR manually in DACIMS, the CDSR was removed
A sample t-test was completed to compare the means between CDSRs that were
100% complete to CDSRs that were less than 100% complete. This was due to concern
that contractors could potentially greatly influence profit in the last 5% of a contract.
A level of significance (α) of 0.05 was used for this test. The null hypothesis for this
test is that the means are equal and the alternative is that they are different. We
failed to reject the null hypothesis. The final usable dataset consisted of 77% of the
original data pull (959 primes and 608 subs).
Table 4. Dataset Exclusions
Criteria
Affected
CDSRs
Affected
Prime
Affected
Sub
Affected
Unknown
Initial Data Pull (Final Reports) 2032 1187 780 67
Exclusion 1: < 95% complete 128 80 36 12
Exclusion 2: Missing Profit 138 29 86 23
Exclusion 3: > 100% Profit 15 0 1 14
Exclusion 4: Duplicates 80 47 29 4
Exclusion 5: O&S Contract 72 51 8 13
Exclusion 6: Missing Phase 20 12 8 1
Exclusion 7: Missing PoP 14 7 4 0
Final Dataset 1567 959 608 0
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Expertise Cohort
The data contains 72 different contractors, ranging in experience levels across 25
years from 1 contract to 177 contacts and from $2.5 million to $61.5 billion. It is
credible that experience level varies greatly. There is no literature which identifies a
# or $ threshold to develop a study of cohorts, but it seems reasonable that the data
itself would reveal such cohorts. In the current study, several methods were applied
to identify cohorts within the data, which will be discussed below. Not all datasets
may reveal such clear cohorts, and thus this method may not be generalizable, but
the method does further the discussion of how longevity and scope of contractual
experience might be important aspects of experiential knowledge, and worth further
exploration of alternative methods.
Figure 3. Scatter plot Identifying “Expertise” Cohort
This study uses the total magnitude of DoD contract dollars and the number
of contracts awarded as a proxy for the level of contractor expertise in the DoD
environment. As an initial assessment of the data, the total value 1 of the contracts
1Costs were escalated to Constant Year (CY) 2018$ based on the period of performance start
year using the aerospace Producer Price Index (PPI)
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and the number of contracts in the given dataset was calculated for each of the 72
unique contractors. A plot of the number of contracts awarded vs total contract value,
shown in Figure 3, provided a visual identification of 3 potential cohorts.
OLS Regression was used to determine if cohort 2 was statistically similar to co-
hort 1 or not. A model was created using the JMP R©’s mixed stepwise OLS function.
Cohort 1 and 2 were both statistically significant and reacted similar.2 Cohort 1 has
slightly stronger associations to profit, which one would expect. Contractors in both
cohort 1 and 2 were deemed to have higher expertise operating in the DoD environ-
ment. Both cohort 1 and 2 were coded as “expert” since they have considerably
more contracts and a higher total value compared to the remaining contractors. It
should be noted that the term “expert” denotes a higher level of experience in the
DoD environment and does not imply other contractors are “novices.” It instead im-
plies the “other” cohort of contractors lack a significant level of unique expertise that
comes with a breadth and depth of work in this unique market. Table 5 provides
the total number of contracts and the total value of the contracts for the contractors
deemed to be in the “expert” cohort.
Table 5. Expert Cohort
Contractor Name Count Total $B
Contractor A 142 $61.5
Contractor B 171 $40.1
Contractor C 177 $35.2
Contractor D 150 $33.5
Contractor E 37 $21.6
Contractor F 59 $20.1
Contractor G 154 $19.2
Contractor H 62 $16.0
Contractor I 69 $13.3
2OLS regression parameter estimates are provided in Appendix A
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Experience cannot be internalized instantaneously into expertise. Missing from
operational knowledge is longevity. To determine if the experience, as defined, cap-
tures longevity, the data was evaluated across time. Table 6 shows the number of
contracts/value($M) by year for each of the contractors in the “expert” cohort as
well as the next 10 contractors.3 A pattern is visible with the “expert” cohort (Con-
tractors A-I) having a larger number and value of contracts over the entire dataset
compared to the next 10 contractors. From this analysis there is credible support
that the cohort is distinct.
Table 6. # Contracts/Dollars across time
1992-01 2002-04 2005-07 2008-10 2011-13 2014-17
Ctr A 4/$5.6 16/$6.8 27/$6.1 49/$24.7 38/$15.0 8/$3.3
Ctr B 5/$7.1 7/$3.0 33/$10.3 56/$8.7 62/$11.0 8/$0.02
Ctr C 2/$1.4 9/$15.0 12/$3.7 56/$8.5 58/$5.4 40/$1.2
Ctr D 1/$1.7 6/$3.3 29/$8.4 49/$10.1 53/$9.0 12/$1.0
Ctr E 2/$4.9 3/$0.1 8/$2.0 16/$9.4 7/$2.6 1/$1.0
Ctr F 22/$10.8 1/$0.03 12/$3.6 24/$5.6
Ctr G 7/$2.4 27/$3.2 51/$6.7 51/$5.6 18/$1.3
Ctr H 4/$4.2 6/$0.1 14/$1.9 19/$5.6 17/$4.1 2/$0.1
Ctr I 1/$1.0 3/$0.6 13/$3.2 21/$6.9 21/$1.5 10/$0.1
Ctr J 4/$1.6 2/$2.1 2/$1.5
Ctr K 13/$5.5 7/$0.6 6/$1.0
Ctr L 2/$3.8 3/$3.0
Ctr M 4/$5.7 9/$0.1 24/$4.6
Ctr N 6/$1.2 15/$2.4
Ctr O 3/$0.1 4/$1.7 2/$1.3
Ctr P 4/$0.1 16/$0.3 17/$0.3
Ctr Q 3/$0.04 4/$0.1 16/$0.5 11/$0.3
Ctr R 1/$0.07 6/$0.3 20/$0.6 12/$0.6 5/$.07
Ctr S 1/$0.3 2/$0.2 13/$0.7 18/0.6 8/$0.1
3Ranked by total contract value
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3.5 Comparison Analysis
The comparison analysis examines the influence of the DoD’s regulations as well as
contractor expertise on profit percentage. In both cases, the means and/or medians
of primes and subs were compared. In terms of regulatory impact, it is theorized
that the profit of primes is largely a by-product of DoD regulations and government
scrutiny. Further it is theorized that the profit of subs is derived by a less regulated
environment. As such, in the age-old question of “excessive profit,” if subs earn higher
profit-margins, it might be called “excessive” or need to be controlled.
The assumption of constant variance must first be tested to determine which sta-
tistical tests are appropriate for the comparison analysis. The Levene’s test was
used to assess the equality of variance for the contractor groups (Prime/Sub and Ex-
pert/Other) (Levene, 1961). The null hypothesis is that the population variances are
equal. A level of significance (α) of 0.05 was used for this test. The null hypothesis
was rejected for both contractor groups, and further statistical tests assumed unequal
variance.
Sample t-tests and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to test for statistical
significance when comparing different groups of data. The sample t-test assumes a
normal distribution and compares the means between two groups to determine if there
is a statistical significance between the two population means. The null hypothesis is
that the two groups are equal and the alternative is that the two groups are different.
The Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis test compares the medians and does not assume
normal distribution. The Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank sum test which
means it combines all the observations and ranks the data 1 to N ignoring group
membership. Then, the test calculates the rank averages within each variable which
calculates the test statistic. The null hypothesis is that the medians between the
two groups are equal and the alternative is that the medians are different. A level of
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significance (α) of 0.05 was used for both tests when used in this study.
3.6 Contingency Table Analysis
A more in depth variation of the expertise hypothesis examines the manifestation
of higher profit regardless of the prime – sub dyad. Figure 5 shows the two dyads
of prime and sub this study is concerned with. Contingency table analysis was used
to explore the hypothesis that dyads of prime and sub influence profit. Contingency
analysis explores the distribution of a categorical variable Y across the levels of a
second categorical variable X. The results will allow us to show how expertise may
have varied impact based on the dyad.
The question is: who earned a higher profit margin on a given contract? A simple
test is a ratio of prime to sub. The ratios of prime to sub-contractor profit margin was
calculated by taking the mean and median profit margin for the prime contractors
on a given contract and dividing it by the corresponding sub-contractors final profit
margin. If the ratio was greater than 1, the prime earned a higher profit margin than
the sub-contractor on the given contract number.
JMP R© was used to complete the contingency analysis for this research. The
analysis results include a mosaic plot, frequency counts, proportions, and tests for
statistical significance.
A subset of the prior dataset was used for this analysis. Only contracts that had
at least one prime and corresponding sub were paired into dyads. Two ratios were
created for each of the 346 sub-contractors identified. While the prime contractor was
the same for each of the 83 unique contract numbers, there could be multiple prime
CDSRs linked to the same contract number. Therefore, a ratio was calculated using
the mean and median profit margin for the prime contractor in the cases where there
was more than one CDSR.
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Figure 4. Contractor Dyads
This ratio was converted to a categorical variable where a value of greater than
one indicated the prime contractor’s profit margin was higher than the sub’s. For
the analysis, this was denoted by a ‘1’ value. If the opposite was true (i.e. ratio
<1 (sub-contractor earning higher profit)), a ‘0’ was used. In a similar way, the two
dyads were converted to categorical variables. A value of ‘1’ was used for dyads in
which both contractors (prime and sub) were “experts” and ‘0’ if both (prime and
sub) contractors were not. This, therefore, created two different contingency tables.
The Fisher’s Exact Test was used to test the statistical significance of the dyads
(Figure 5). This test assumes all observations are independent and presents a con-
ditional exact inference. An exact inference does not rely on assumptions that pa-
rameters hold true through infinity, but is an exact calculation of a p-value given the
data presented (Agresti, 1992). This research only uses the 1-tailed hypothesis test
to determine whether or not the dyads significantly effect the ratio of a prime’s profit
margin to it’s corresponding sub’s profit margin.
An Odds Ratio (OR) can also be calculated using contingency tables. The OR is
the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one group to the odds of the same event
occurring in another group. This research predicts which contracting group (prime
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or sub) earns a higher profit margin given the different dyads. To calculate OR, first
calculate the odds of a prime earning a higher a profit margin given (x) variable.
Next, calculate the odds of a prime earning a higher profit margin given the same (x)
variable is missing. Finally, divide the odds of step one by the odds of step two.
3.7 OLS Regression
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to expand the analysis and de-
termine if the proxy of expertise would appear predictive when analyzed with other
potential profit drivers. The dependent variable used to identify profit drivers as well
as determine which were most predictive was profit margin percentage. The explana-
tory variables used in the regression model are shown in Table 7. Three periods of
performance (PoP ≤ 1, PoP ≤ 2, PoP ≤ 3) were also tested for statistical significance.
The model was created using the JMP R©’s mixed stepwise OLS function. A level of
significance was set to 0.05 to determine the predictive ability of the explanatory
variables in Table 7. The model was also tested for normality, constant variance,
multicollinearity, and outliers.
Table 7. Categorical Variables used in OLS Regression
Contractor
Expertise
Service
Contract
Type
Life-cycle
Phase
Platform
Expert Air Force Fixed Price Development Aircraft
Other Army Cost Plus Production
Electronic/
Automated System
Navy Mixed/Other Missile
Ordnance
Ship
Space
Surface Vehicle
UAV
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3.8 Summary
Chapter 3 discussed the methodology used to examine profit margin percentages
between primes and subcontractors for ACAT I Major Defense Acquisitions Programs
(MDAP). This section provided the source of the data, the profit margin calculations,
and described the data cleaning process. This section finally explained the statistical
process used to perform the analysis in Chapter 4.
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IV. Analysis
4.1 Overview
Chapter 4 presents the analysis and results for this study. First, descriptive statis-
tics associated with the dataset shown in Table 4 are presented. Next, we use com-
parison analysis via t-test and Wilcoxon/ Kruskal-Wallis test to determine if there
is a statistically significant difference between prime and sub-contractor profit and
expertise cohorts. We then present the results of the contingency analysis used to
statistically examine the dyads of prime and sub. Finally, we present the results of
the OLS regression model used to identify profit drivers.
4.2 Comparison Analysis
The comparison analysis examines the influence of the DoD’s regulations as well as
expertise on profit margin percentage. To better understand the influence of regula-
tions, a comparison of prime and sub-contractor profit margins was completed. Means
and medians were determined for primes and sub-contractor profit margins. Sample
t-tests and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to test for statistical significance
when comparing prime and sub-contractor profit margins. The null hypothesis for
both tests is that the two groups are equal. The significance (α) used was 0.05.
Table 8 organizes the means and medians of the variables analyzed for easy com-
parison. The total aggregates are the in the first line. Further lines break down the
aggregate. The hypothesis tests with a p-value less than 0.05 were found to be sta-
tistically significant and are highlighted in Table 8.1 The “expert” cohort was most
significant with a p-value of less than 0.0001 for both the t-test and Wilcoxon/Kruskal-
Wallis test. Subsequent analysis focuses on the “expert” variable.
1Appendix B includes descriptive statistics by commodity
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Table 8. Comparison Results
Variable
Sample Size
(Prime/Sub)
Median
(Prime/Sub)
Mean
(Prime/Sub)
Std Dev
(Prime/Sub)
Aggregate 959 / 608 12.3% / 13.8% 13.9% / 15.0% 12.7% / 13.9%
Dev 147 / 72 8.0% / 7.7% 4.5% / 7.1% 12.8% / 12.7%
Prod 812 / 536 13.6% / 14.8% 15.6% / 16.0% 11.9% / 13.6%
Cost 213 / 103 9.5% / 10.2% 9.6% / 13.9% 4.6% / 12.8%
Fixed 559 / 409 15.3% / 15.3% 15.5% / 15.7% 14.6% / 15.1%
Other 187 /96 12.1% / 12.6% 13.8% / 12.8% 11.6% / 7.0%
Air Force 164 / 42 13.1% / 12.3% 17.5% / 11.4% 15.0% / 15.0%
Army 383 / 154 11.5% / 11.2% 13.5% / 12.5% 13.6% / 14.8%
Navy 412 / 413 12.6% / 14.4% 12.8% / 16.3% 10.2% / 13.3%
Expert Ctr 719 / 302 13.0% / 15.2% 14.6% / 17.8% 10.2% / 11.9%
Other Ctr 240 / 306 10.1% / 11.6% 11.7% / 12.0% 17.9% / 14.8%
Table 9 focuses on the last two lines of Table 8, the “expert” cohort and “other”
cohort of contractors. Table 9 allows for a horizontical and vertical comparison.
There is a statistically significant difference between “expert” primes’ and “expert”
sub-contractors’ profit margins. The sub-contractor earning a higher profit margin
in this case.2 Additionally, there is a statistically significant difference between the
“expert” cohort and “other”. Experts earn higher profit margins regardless of whether
they are operating as a prime or sub-contractor. The null hypothesis is accepted when
comparing the “other” contractors by prime and sub-contractor, meaning there is not
a statistical difference in their profit margins.
Table 9. Interactions Hypothesis Tests
Prime: Mean Sub: Mean T-test
Wilcoxon/
Kruskal-Wallis
Expert 14.6% 17.8% <0.0001* <0.0001*
Other 11.7% 12.0% 0.7877 0.3258
T-Test 0.0155 <0.0001*
Wilcoxon/
Kruskal-Wallis
<0.0001* <0.0001*
2Tests with p-values less than 0.05 are statistically significant
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These results suggest that the economic theories reviewed in Chapter 2 are relevant
to this discussion. While a number of theories could be applied, the two most relevant
are principal-agent and transactional cost theories. Applying these theories, we can
begin to explain the findings in Table 9 which we explore further in the next section.
Experts have more information surrounding the operations of the defence industry
and the DoD’s complex regulations. They can therefore exploit this information
to lower their transactional costs and increase their profit margins. The opposite
holds true for less experienced contractors who do not have the same resources and
knowledge of the DoD environment. Their transactional costs are likely higher which
reduces their profit margins.
As suggested in Chapter 2, information asymmetry, which is connected to con-
tractor profit margin, can be reduced by screening and regulation. This allows the
DoD to monitor and regulate profit earned by primes. Conversely, for subcontractors,
Table 9 shows a larger change in the mean profit earned between the expert cohort
of contractors and others. This may be a result of both information asymmetry and
negotiating power. Expert subcontractors are likely able to exploit the lower levels of
DoD regulation which gives a more free-market style condition under which profit is
determined. Moreover, they retain their low transaction costs compared to less-expert
contractors which increases their profit margin.
What Table 9 cannot show is how expertise may correlate with profit when the
“other” contractor in a prime-sub relationship does not have expertise. Using a subset
of the data, we explore how relationships influence profit. The concerned dyads are
shown in Figure 5 and are analyzed using contingency analysis in the Section 4.3
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4.3 Contingency Analysis
Contingency analysis goes one level deeper to test if expertise allows for advantages
relative to non-expertise. The comparison analysis already identified that “expert”
subs do a lot better than “other’ subs. Expertise could potentially allow one contrac-
tor to take advantage over the other in a dyad of prime and sub. Figure 5 provides
the two dyads of prime and sub this study is concerned with. The ratios calculated in
Chapter 3 were used for this analysis. Two ratios were created, one using the mean
profit margin of prime contractor on a given contract and one using the median. The
results for both ratios were the same.
Figure 5. Contractor Dyads
The comparison analysis suggests that the prime contractor will earn a higher
profit margin when paired with a sub not identified in the “expert” cohort as shown
in Table 8. The mosaic plot for the dyad of expert prime - other sub is displayed by
Figure 6. The contingency table analysis concludes that the prime earned a higher
profit margin compared to the sub 60% of the time. The Fisher’s Exact Test finds
that the profit margin difference is statistically significant with a right tail p-value
<0.0001. A right tail test indicates that the probability of a prime contractor earning
higher profit margin percentage, compared to its corresponding sub-contractor, is
greater for that dyad.
35
Figure 6. Contingency Table (Expert Prime - Other Sub)
Figure 7 displays the mosaic plot of the dyad of expert prime - expert sub. The
analysis concludes that for 67% of the contracts analyzed the sub-contractor earned a
higher profit margin percentage. The Fisher’s test finds statistically significant left tail
with a p-value of 0.0017. A left tail significance in this case indicates the probability
of a sub-contractor earning a higher profit margin percentage than a prime is greater
for this dyad. This finding is the opposite of the previous dyad analyzed.
Figure 7. Contingency Table (Expert Prime - Expert Sub)
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As previously described in Chapter 3, the odds ratio calculates the probability of
an event occurring in one dyad and the same event occurring in the other dyad. The
result of this analysis shows that the probability of a prime earning a higher profit
margin percentage compared to the sub is 3.2 times greater for the expert prime -
other sub dyad. Similarly, for the expert prime - expert sub dyad, the odds ratio of
a prime earning more than a sub is 0.4. If the inverse of this value is calculated, the
odds of a subcontractor earning higher profit percentage is approximately 2.5 times
greater than a prime for this dyads. This agrees with the comparison analysis that
expert sub-contractors are likely to earn higher profit margins due to regulation and
information asymmetry.
The 95% confidence intervals for both odds ratios are shown in Table 10. The
confidence intervals are relatively tight which indicates the odds ratios are stable.
This means that there is a 95% probability that the confidence intervals contain the
true odds ratio.
Table 10. Odds Ratio Confidence Intervals
Dyad Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95%
Expert Prime -
Other Sub
3.2 2.1 5.0
Expert Prime -
Expert Sub
0.4 0.3 0.6
4.4 OLS Regression
The focus of this study is to better understand the effect of a contractors’ expertise
and government control on defense contractor profit. However, it is understood that
there are many other variables that effect profit beyond what is included in this
analysis. Table 8 already reveals this to be true by comparing prime and subs.
This portion of the research sought to identify potential drivers of Profit% by using
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression.
The explanatory variables shown in Table 7 were analyzed as profit margin pre-
dictors. The model was created using the JMP R©’s mixed stepwise OLS function.
A level of significance was set to 0.05 to determine the predictive ability of the ex-
planatory variables in Table 7. The R2 value for the model was 0.13 with seven
statistically significant variables. This suggests that there are many different drivers
for profit beyond the variables detailed in Table 7. These include macro-economic fac-
tors relating to contractor business environment, negotiation techniques and program
specific drivers. The standard beta value output from the OLS regression model can
be used to compare the strength of the independent variable. The following sections
discuss the results of the created OLS model.
The standard beta coefficient compares the strength of the independent variables
to the explanatory variables. The greater the number the stronger the effect on Profit
percentage. The two most predictive variables were found to be program phase and
contractor expertise as shown in Table 11. Production contracts and expert con-
tractors also statistically earning higher profit. Previous research has identified that
production contracts typically earn higher profit percentages compared to develop-
ment contracts as discussed in Chapter 2. The positive standard beta coefficients
support this finding.
Table 11. Model VIF Scores and Standard Beta Coefficients
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The standard beta coefficient indicates that the second strongest explanatory vari-
able found, in this model, was the “Expert” variable. Expert contractors therefore
are predicted to earn higher profit percentages. This is supported by the analysis
of the literature presented in chapter 2 and is the focus of this thesis. A noticeably
missing variable from the OLS model is prime vs sub. This matches the findings of
the comparison analysis, at the aggregate level there is little difference between prime
and sub-contractor profit margins.
The positive standard beta coefficient for fixed contracts is explained by the DoD’s
profit policy reviewed in Chapter 2. Firm fixed contracts have the potential to earn
a higher profit margin due to the potential for higher risk to the contractor. Only
three commodities were found to be statistically significant with only Space contracts
having a positive standard beta coefficient and being the third strongest explanatory
variable.
Table 11 shows, in certain cases, a negative standard beta value. This indicates
that profit percentage is likely to decrease where this explanatory variable is present.
For example, when the period of performance of a contract is less than or equal to
one year the profit margin is likely reduced. A key oversight of the OLS regression
model is the dyad of prime and sub. This limitation is explored in the contingency
analysis in section 4.3.
A series of further tests substantiate the accuracy and applicability of the OLS
regression model. These tests are used to detect:
• Input assumptions for the model
• Multicollinearity
• Overly influential data points
• Outliers
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The Shapiro-Wilks goodness of fit test was used test the assumption of normality
and the Breusch-Pagan test was used to test the assumption of constant variance
for the model. Based on the p-values, both tests failed statistically. However, after
reviewing the graphs associated with each tests, the statistical tests were considered to
be a “soft fail.” 3 Figure 8 shows that the residuals appear to be normally distributed
and Figure 9 shows the residuals versus predicted plot appears to have constant
variance. Since the model created was only used to identify drivers of the explanatory
variables, these test were not a major concern.
Figure 8. Histogram of Residuals
Figure 9. Residuals by Predicted Plot
3A soft fail can be described as one where the p-value indicates a failed test, however a plot of
the data shows a normal distribution or constant variance
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VIF scores are used to identify multicollinearity (correlation between predictors)
within regression analysis. VIF scores that are above 5 suggest there is linear depen-
dency between two ore more independent variables and therefore should be removed
from the model. The VIF scores for the independent variables in this this analysis
were all below 5 (shown in Table 11).
The Cook’s Distance detects overly influential data points that could possible skew
the results. Typically, if a Cook’s D value is greater than 0.5, the data point(s) are
justified for removal. No points were removed from the Cook’s Distance plot shown
in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Cook’s Distance Plot
A histogram of the studentized residuals identifies potential outliers in the data.
The status quo for this analysis is 3 standard deviations above or below the normal
distribution’s mean of zero. Figure 11 shows the histogram for the studentized resid-
uals for this analysis. Since there are many variables that potentially effect profit, it
was assumed that there would be outliers and they were not removed. 97.5% of the
data fell within 3 standard deviations.
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Figure 11. Studentized Residuals
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
It might be argued that the experts earn higher profit margins because they are
merely doing larger contracts. A at the median size of the contract for each cohort of
contractors (expert and other) confirms that experts do have larger contracts. The
results provided in Table 12 show that at the aggregate the median contract size for
“expert” contractors is $58M larger compared to “other” contractors. The results are
similar when the aggregate is broken down by prime and sub-contractors.
Table 12. Median Contract Size
Variable Expert Other
Aggregate $98M $40M
Prime $114M $79M
Sub $81M $26M
But, what is the relationship between contract size and profit margin? We can
do a rough test. It must be rough because because contract size would appear on
both sides of the OLS equation (showing up in the denominator of profit margin).
Because of this any slope produced would be uncertain. Nonetheless, running it for
a broad overview reveals that, in the aggregate, there is no relationship between
contract size and profit anyway. Applying the same test to subsets offers no challenge
to our interpretation. The test was applied to the “expert” cohort of contractors, the
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“other” cohort, primes, and subs, and then the further subset of expert-subs. The
“other” cohort nearly shows a relationship, with a p-value of 0.0532, but its slope
is negative and the R-square minimal. If we can tentatively enter this as evidence,
it is evidence that further supports our finding, revealing that size appears to tend
toward a negative correlation with profit instead of a positive. The expert-subs has a
more convincing negative relationship, though failing a test of normality. As such, we
can confidently conclude that the higher profit margin we observe among the expert
contractors in our original test is not a product of the scope of the projects they are
involved.
It also might be argued that the designation of the cohort is arbitrary and that
there is merely a continuum of expertise from little to a lot. To test that counter-
hypothesis, we ran two parallel OLS Regression tests using the two components of
our variable of expertise, total dollar amount of contracts for a given contractor, and
total number of contracts for a given contractor. We regressed each to the median
profit each earned from all those dollars and contracts, respectively. We found no
statistically significant correlation between these components and profits across the
whole database. Total dollars does not correlate to a contractor’s median profit. Nor
does the total number for contracts.4
4.6 Summary
At the aggregate level profit percentage is more consistent for prime contractors
than subs as shown by the standard deviation. When the data is analyzed by contract
type, commodity and other variables, patterns can be seen in the data. Further anal-
ysis of these by comparison analysis, contingency table analysis, and OLS regression
shows statistical significance of some of these variables.
4Results of these statistical tests can be found in Appendix C
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The comparison analysis shows little difference in profit percentages between prime
and sub contractors at the aggregate level. When the expertise factor is introduced,
a statistically significant difference is seen. This further reinforces the importance of
contractor expertise and its influence on profit percentage.
The contingency analysis shows the importance of relationships between prime
and sub-contractors and DoD regulation. The number of expert contractors is small,
therefore, there is a small number of possible expert prime and expert sub contrac-
tor combinations (i.e. dyad 2). Over time, relationships between these contractors
strengthens. This decreases issues arising from information asymmetry and, given the
small contractor numbers, promotes collective bargaining, as discussed in Chapter 2.
OLS regression shows that a number of explanatory variables can predict profit
percentage. The most predictive variables were found to be program phase and
contractor expertise. The program phase finding is consistent with previous research
identified in Chapter 2.
Sub-contractors are not as scrutinized, by the government, as prime contractors,
however, this analysis indicates that prime contractors should potentially screen sub-
contractor costs. This may prove difficult to implement give the aforementioned
relationships between expert prime and expert sub-contractors.
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V. Conclusions and Future Research
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery
frequently watch over their own” - Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776) p. 408
5.1 Conclusion
This research set out to better understand the conditions where in defense contrac-
tor profit margins may be higher. A general argument would be that sub-contractors
potentially earn higher profit margins compared to primes. A review of economic
theories and market concentration suggests that contractor expertise in the DoD en-
vironment influences profit earned, and that we should specifically look at “expert”
sub-contractors. This study uses the magnitude of DoD contract dollars and the
number of contracts awarded as a proxy for expertise.
Government control was analyzed by comparing prime and sub-contractor profit
margins. Regulations dictate that primes are more scrutinized than subs, suggesting
that subs are in a better position to earn higher profit margins. The study shows that
the expertise proxy is a statistically significant variable in determining profit margin
for ACAT I programs. DoD regulations, largely controlling the prime contractor,
have a distinct influence on and reduce the variation of profit margin percent. This
potentially indicates the profit policy and purpose of the regulations is successful.
Sub-contractor profit margin display larger variation, as would be expected, owing
to less scrutiny, potential exploitation of information asymmetry and competitive
market conditions. Relationships are analyzed through contingency analysis using
dyads of prime and sub. This analysis found both dyads analyzed (expert prime –
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other sub and expert prime – expert sub) to be statistically significant and showed
the probability of a prime contractor earning a higher profit margin is greater when
the sub is not characterized as an expert. The opposite was found to be true when
both contractors were characterized as experts. Regardless of an experts role (prime or
sub), they always command a higher profit margin than contractors not characterized
as expert. This effect statistically increased when the expert is a sub-contractor and
therefore subjected to less regulatory scrutiny.
OLS regression identified a number of explanatory variable as being predictive of
profit margins. The two most predictive variables were found to be program phase
and contractor expertise. It was noticeable that at the aggregate level, the variable
of prime and sub was not a predictive variable.
Ultimately, the purpose of business is to return a profit to its shareholders. The
DoD must recognize this and understand that profit can be a driver of innovation and
increase the quality of a good or service provide to it. As stated at the beginning of
this thesis, defining “excessive” profit is difficult. Among other things, profit is the
result of good business practice and innovative product. Therefore, the higher profits
commanded by the “expert” cohort of contractors, as identified in this study, may be
warranted. Areas of further analysis are identified in the next section.
5.2 Future Research
This research only used CDSRs which could be exported from DACIMS and used a
limited number of variables for analysis. Future research could manually collect data
from the system which may enable more variables to be analyzed. Variables such
as contract type and program phase can be further decomposed for more detailed
analysis. An analysis of the negotiated profit, compared to the realized profit will
shed more light on the true value of expertise. Additionally, examining performance
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metrics such as costs and schedule variance can help determine if higher profit is
warranted.
Profit margins were not analyzed in regards to period of performance start and
end date and the change in profit margin over the years. Future research should
examine this and highlight trends related to this. An interesting analysis could focus
on the effect of mergers and acquisitions within the defense industry, macro-economic
factors such as interest rates, domestic GDP and stock market performance and
political environmental variables such as DoD budget.
Further exploration of the relationships between prime and sub contractors is re-
quired to understand why the effects, shown in this study, are occurring. Moreover, an
understanding of the root-causes of these identified effects is required. This will help
determine if pass-through regulations should be reviewed or if expert sub-contractor
charges are deserving of their increased profit.
A limitation of this study is the understanding of labor flow-down among con-
tractors. It is unknown if prime contractors are simply sub-contracting to another
expert and therefore acting as a project manager. The ultimate effect of this may be
that the DoD pays profit twice. An analysis of this should examine the proportion
of labor to management charges. Currently sub-contractor charges are built within a
prime’s costs and invisible to the DoD unless the total sub-contracted value is over
70% of the contract value. This is a recent addition (2013) to the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation which requires additional justification for such pass-through charges.
Therefore a study comparing pre- and post- 2013 contractor dyad profit margins could
provide insight into the success of this new addition and the proportion of labor to
management charges.
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Appendix A. OLS Regression - Cohort Analysis
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Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics by Commodity
Variable
Sample Size
(Prime/Sub)
Median
(Prime/Sub)
Mean
(Prime/Sub)
Std Dev
(Prime/Sub)
Aircraft 365 / 443 14.7% / 14.2% 16.1% / 15.3% 10.4% / 14.5%
Electronic/
Automated
129 / 45 8.8% / 8.0% 11.3% / 7.5% 14.0% / 6.3%
Missiles 104 / 45 13.0% / 15.6% 15.5% / 17.9% 12.4% / 10.7%
Ordnance 8 / 14 12.4% / 20.5% 10.2% / 19.3% 5.3% / 7.4%
Ship 83 / 18 12.2% / 9.6% 10.8% / 12.3% 9.5% / 14.3%
Space 58 / 17 16.7% / 11.4% 20.1% / 14.1% 17.0% / 11.5%
Surface
Vehicle
164 / 7 10.0% / 21.0% 9.4% / 19.8% 14.8% / 20.0%
System of
System
2 / 7 10.6% / 19.1% 10.6% / 19.6% 2.4% / 15.6%
UAV 46 / 12 12.3% / 14.5% 13.9% / 12.6% 8.7% / 5.4%
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Appendix C. Sensitivity Analysis
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Profit earned by defense contractors is a controversial issue among government officials and the defense industry. It is
recognized that profits earned by defense contractors are not strictly the product of the dynamics of a competitive
market but of federal profit statutes, contractual incentive schemes, the quality of government oversight, and in a market
of less than full competition. As such, there is always concern of whether contractors are earning “excessive” profit –
through policy or failed oversight. The purpose of this research is to investigate the question of reasonable profits from
one particular angle – whether profit margins differ among two different categories of contractors, primes and
sub-contractors. The study finds that sub-contractors, in the aggregate do not earn higher median profits than primes.
However, it finds that expertise does appear to be a significant characteristic at a finer level of analysis. Expertise
correlates with higher median profits. And, sub-contractors who exhibit this expertise earn higher median profits than
both their primes and other sub-contractors.
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